When European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen talked of a “geopolitical commission” in 2019, her intent was closer to direction of policy travel rather than an urgent and detailed plan aimed at creating a security union with complete defence capabilities. But geopolitical imperatives are now driving the EU’s development, including in defence and securing economic leverage.
The EU’s Security Union strategy, adopted in 2020, began with a conceptual framework complementary to NATO. Now, it is guided by the organisation’s “2030 defence readiness” goal whereby—to buttress its security capabilities—the EU is implementing a defence-oriented internal security strategy. And to address economic risks and dependencies, since 2023 the EU has also been rolling out an economic security strategy that it is continuously expanding. This involves, among other things, legal instruments such as the anti-coercion tool.
But nowhere is the EU’s changing approach to geopolitics clearer than in enlargement. As the union focuses on consolidating its influence in response to the Russian threat to the east and the American coercion in the west, it needs to ensure that it is not neglecting conditionality for the sake of geopolitical wins.
Geopolitics is now also impacting EU enlargement and its key instrument of conditionality (whereby candidate countries must meet specific criteria and requirements in order to join the EU). The Russian war in Ukraine has placed geopolitical considerations at the core of the negotiation process. This is clear with the approach to both Ukraine and Moldova, both of which have applied for membership in 2022.
While the 2027 timeline appears unrealistic for Moldova, political conversations about a contracted negotiation timeframe already suggest that the EU is shifting its approach
While negotiations usually take years, there are indications that Ukraine could join the EU as early as 2027 as part of a negotiated ceasefire deal led by the US. The EU could extend a similar logic to Moldova, given the persistent risk of Russian encroachment and hybrid warfare. While the 2027 timeline appears unrealistic for Moldova, political conversations about a contracted negotiation timeframe suggest the EU is shifting its approach—despite the difficulties in adopting, implementing and embedding EU norms and practices in that country.
EU conditionality is also encountering further headwind from the US. America’s 2025 National Security Strategy combines a bitter and hostile critique of the EU and its policies with a supportive stance for what the Trump administration deems “healthy nations”—including unstable states in the Western Balkans—to negotiate with Brussels. By cultivating resistance towards the EU in this region, America would only deepen these states’ reluctance to align with EU laws and practices.
For example, Montenegro has adopted international agreements which allow non-competitive public procurement tenders despite the closure of the relevant accession negotiation chapter, thereby contravening EU law. Likewise, Serbia has signed a free-trade agreement with China, regardless of negative EU reactions. It is plausible, then, that these states could end up closing similar agreements with the US.
During previous enlargement events, the US implemented support programmes which complemented EU accession in areas such as judicial reform, combatting organised crime and home affairs. But this is unlikely to continue under the current US administration.
Geopolitically motivated enlargement could have other implications for the EU’s approach to conditionality. Bringing in the Western Balkan candidates, Ukraine and Moldova for geopolitical reasons would constitute another “big bang” EU expansion as in 2004 and 2007. This could lead to public resistance in many member states. Apart from overcoming public scepticism, it would require the EU to resolve a major constitutional matter: shifting from unanimity to majority voting in decision-making.
France and Germany are already pushing for this transformation to take place, initially in the foreign and security policy field. But this requires changes to EU treaties, which are next to impossible to align with an accelerated enlargement timeframe. Current legal possibilities to move to majority voting on an ad hoc basis require unanimity. While member states have long considered these issues as legal technicalities, as EU integration enters core national sovereignty areas such as defence and security, such matters will generate disagreement and lead to intra-EU dysfunctionality.
European politicians face serious dilemmas. First, how do they balance the geopolitical logic of enlargement with the EU’s stated policy of embedded preparedness for accession? The latter ensures that EU norms, institutions and practices are not simply adopted but sustainably internalised and implemented. This was a major lesson of the 2004-2007 enlargement wave into central and eastern Europe, given persistent problems in, for instance, the judicial field.
Second, how should the EU respond to US support for parties in the Western Balkans which are more interested in playing all sides than in strong EU membership? The EU needs to ensure that what Trump offers is not more tempting than what states could gain from being in the bloc.
Third, how can the EU advance merit-based accession even at the potential cost of disrupting US commitment to NATO? This could have a negative effect in southeastern Europe, with such quandaries becoming ever more pertinent as geopolitical risks escalate.
All things considered
The temptation of “having your cake and eating it too”—balancing geopolitical priorities with a merit-based accession process—is understandable. The European Council, which met on 18th and 19th December, has suggested doing both simultaneously. Progress, however, is a tall order. The EU is likely to at least consider various membership suspension mechanisms, continued reform monitoring after accession and stricter conditionality in relation to access to EU funding.
Economically, further financial assistance to counter the influence of third countries (such as China, Iran and also America) is all but certain. Supportive political rhetoric and active diplomacy will keep EU enlargement on the agenda. Yet, the stronger emphasis on geopolitics does entail the return of the prospect of war despite the reluctancy of many politicians to admit this reality. In such a world, geopolitics will ultimately surpass other considerations.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
