Pakistan is once again in international conversation — feted briefly by Washington, embraced symbolically by Riyadh, and shielded strategically by Beijing. In Islamabad, this is being spun as a return to geopolitical relevance. In reality, however, it is survival theatre: The illusion of power masking the erosion of sovereignty. None of these recent diplomatic signals represents trust. They represent containment, management, and utility. Pakistan is not being courted. It is being handled.
The United States’ re-engagement with Pakistan is not a strategic endorsement; it is a tactical recalibration. The US needs Pakistan as a negotiable flank for three theatres: The instability in Afghanistan, the continuing uncertainty around Iran, and as a low-cost lever within China’s expanding orbit. Once these variables shift, Pakistan’s shelf life in American policy will shrink again.
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The deeper truth is visible in what American officials now say openly: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal operates under indirect US oversight. This confirms what scholars, intelligence agencies, and the Indian strategic community have long known — Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, but not autonomous nuclear power. A state boasting strategic depth but operating under supervisory control is not a nuclear peer.
The renewed defence pact with Saudi Arabia has been celebrated in Pakistan as proof of “Islamic fraternity”. In substance, it reflects Riyadh’s continued need for external manpower to buffer its own security architecture. The Kingdom does not outsource deterrence because of Pakistan’s reliability; it does so because it is expeditious and inexpensive.
This is the most revealing measure of Pakistan’s condition. Strategic partnerships are built on capability. Subcontracted roles are built on dependence. Riyadh does not look to Pakistan as a partner that shapes outcomes, only as one that fills tactical gaps. That distinction separates prestige diplomacy from survival diplomacy.
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China is no longer a friendly ally in Pakistan’s future, it is the creditor that holds the mortgage on it. Ports, special economic zones, minerals, and digital infrastructure are now effectively Chinese-administered strategic spaces. Pakistan retains the façade of policymaking; the leverage rests elsewhere.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has hardly transformed Pakistan into a commercial hub. Beijing does not invest in Pakistan’s sovereignty, it invests in Pakistan’s compliance. This is why China’s focus today has shifted from infrastructure to resource extraction, particularly rare earth elements. Pakistan’s collapsing economy has reduced these reserves from national assets to collateral inventory.
Pakistan’s economy no longer operates on productivity but on periodic bailouts. International Monetary Fund loans keep it solvent on paper. Saudi deposits suspend collapse for political goodwill. Chinese lending deepens structural vulnerability in exchange for physical concessions.
The Pakistani state cannot stabilise its currency, revive investment confidence, or arrest inflation without external underwriting. Governance has been replaced by diplomatic fundraising. When a country’s foreign policy becomes indistinguishable from debt negotiation, it has ceased to exercise sovereignty in any meaningful sense. This dependency is not accidental. It is the cumulative result of Pakistan substituting long-term institution-building with short-term leverage for decades.
Domestically, the crisis of democracy is worsening. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, arguably the most popular leader Pakistan has seen in the last few decades, remains behind bars, facing a series of politically charged cases that highlight the paralysis of institutions in the country.
Pakistan’s foreign policy for decades relied on its status as a geopolitical broker first during the Cold War and then in the extended Afghan theatre. Pakistani officials have now admitted, with televised candour, that the state trained and supplied militant actors at the behest of foreign powers. These groups later became instruments of Pakistan’s own coercive diplomacy against India and Afghanistan.
But a country that sustains itself through calibrated instability eventually becomes hostage to it. Pakistan is living that outcome now. Once the world recognises that a country’s influence rests on exporting turbulence rather than stability, it ceases to be a power and becomes a variable. Today Pakistan is not feared, nor admired, nor trusted; it is merely managed.
The unavoidable contrast in South Asia is the rising divergence between India and Pakistan. While Pakistan negotiates survival, India negotiates advantage. New Delhi is sought as a strategic partner because it creates economic value (India’s economy is 10 times larger than Pakistan’s) and security stability. Islamabad is sought only when a risk buffer is needed.
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India is not a rentier state and its sovereignty is not collateralised. This is why India today is part of economic coalitions and emerging technology blocs, while Pakistan remains entangled in relief negotiations and transactional alignments. Where India is shaping outcomes, Pakistan is pleading for exceptions. Pakistan has not returned to geopolitical importance. It has merely returned to geopolitical visibility.
The United States engages Pakistan because it still needs a local instrument. Saudi Arabia engages Pakistan because it needs military labour. China engages Pakistan because it sees exploitable concessions. None of these engagements dignifies Pakistan as a stabilising power. In a region that is moving toward long-term strategic rebalancing, Pakistan remains trapped in a cycle of rented relevance.
The writer is a lieutenant colonel (veteran), former Armoured Corps officer and defence analyst
