In December 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recited a poem during his visit to Baku, Azerbaijan, mentioning how the Aras River separates the Azeri people, with one side under Azeri territory and the other side under Iranian territory. In response, then-foreign minister of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted that Erdoğan should take a lesson on Iranian history.
This exchange highlights the complex dynamics of contemporary Iranian–Turkish relations. While Ankara and Tehran clash on issues like Israel, the United States, and Kurdish separatism, they have also managed to selectively cooperate on these very issues when it serves their national interests.
Historical Background
At its core, “the current relationship between Turkey and Iran is loaded with historical legacy,” due to the immense rivalry between the Safavid Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The Safavid Empire’s loss in the Battle of Chaldiran effectively limited Shia Islam within Iranian borders, while the rest of the Middle East remained predominantly Sunni.
During the 20th century, Iran and Türkiye pursued similar modernization policies under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Pahlavi Dynasty. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Türkiye’s secular Kemalist establishment perceived Iran’s propagation of political Islam as a threat. Even minor issues became a source of contention, such as when the Iranians criticized the Turkish government for its rigid rules on the hijab.
Since the mid-2000s, the Iranians have become suspicious of Türkiye’s growing neo-Ottoman foreign policy ambitions under Erdoğan. Neo-Ottomanism is a Turkish foreign policy doctrine that seeks to elevate Turkish influence in former Ottoman territories.
Double-Edged Sword: The United States and Israel
Ever since the 1979 Revolution, the raison d’être of Iran has been to challenge American and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. On the contrary, Türkiye has diplomatic relations with Israel and maintains a close security partnership with the United States. Given the two countries’ diametrically different ties with Washington and Tel Aviv, this has led to friction between them.
In 2011, when Türkiye agreed to host NATO’s early warning radar system at Kürecik base, Iran accused Türkiye of capitulating to American and Israeli interests. In 2022, Türkiye released footage of Iranian agents being captured and informed the Israeli government about the activities of captured agents in the country. By publicly releasing this footage, Ankara wanted to ensure it preserved its ties with Tel Aviv, but also sent a message to Tehran that rogue assassinations are unacceptable on Turkish soil.
At the same time, the Turks and Iranians have cooperated to challenge American and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East if it helps their national interests.
In 2016, the United States arrested an Iranian-Turkish gold trader, Reza Zarrab, on charges of violating Iranian sanctions laws. In his testimony, Zarrab said that in 2012, Erdoğan, who was the Prime Minister at the time, and the treasury minister had given him orders to facilitate trade via Turkish banks. In 2019, a US court indicted Turkish Halkbank on charges of secretly transferring $20 billion to Iran and converting oil revenue into gold and cash. In 2024, the U.S. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled 3-0 that the bank can be prosecuted under American law, rejecting the bank’s claim that, as a state-owned entity, it is immune from foreign prosecution.
With this quid pro quo arrangement, the Turks benefit from access to Iranian oil and markets in Central Asia. Likewise, the Iranians benefit from accessing critical goods amid the aforementioned sanctions regime.. More generally, deep economic connections have helped to incentivize the two countries to de-escalate tensions.
In addition, the Turks have always insisted that a diplomatic solution is needed to resolve Iran’s nuclear program and have opposed a potential Iranian war against the United States and Israel.
Importantly, in the wake of Israel’s military campaigns against Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, the 12 Day Iran-Israel War, and the recent attacks on Qatar, there is a growing unease within Türkiye on Israel’s true intentions. According to Serhat Suha Cubukcuoglu, an Istanbul-based analyst at Trends Research and Advisory, there is a perception within Ankara that Tel Aviv may eventually extend such operations” inside Turkish territory.
Consequently, the Turks see it in their interests to use their close ties with the United States and Iran to mediate and ensure tensions do not reach the point of no return and to keep a check on further Israeli hegemonic behavior. Similarly, Iran considers it advantageous that Türkiye’s close security relationship with the United States allows important messages intended for Washington to be communicated promptly.
Kurdish Separatism
Another problem that continues to affect Iran-Türkiye relations is Kurdish separatism. On numerous occasions, Iran has aided the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), most notably in response to Türkiye’s incitement of pan-Turkism among Iran’s Azeri population. Tehran’s fears of Ankara inciting pan-Turkism have escalated ever since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, as many in Tehran’s establishment believe that Ankara’s aid allowed Baku to win the war.
In March 2025, these tensions came to light during an Al Jazeera interview in which Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan indirectly referenced how Iran’s support for the Syrian Kurds could lead Türkiye to incite pan-Turkish sentiment among Iranian Azeris.
However, they have also found ways to cooperate in fighting Kurdish separatism. At the core, both countries vehemently oppose an independent Kurdistan, as they announced a joint operation against the PKK in 2019. They have also accused foreign powers of attempting to promote secessionist movements among the Kurdish community as part of a plot to sabotage ties between Iran and Türkiye.
From Iran’s perspective, working with Türkiye on Kurdish separatism helps to prevent Ankara from drifting toward the West, namely the United States. Ankara is incentivized to ensure that Iran does not have a reason to weaken Turkish influence in the region. In fact, one of the reasons for Türkiye’s recent deal with the PKK to end hostilities for good was to prevent external actors like Iran from exploiting the PKK-Turkish conflict.
Ways to Maintain Iranian and Turkish Cooperation
Aside from merely extending rhetorical support, Türkiye should take on a larger role in facilitating nuclear talks between Iran and the West. As both a major Muslim country and a NATO member, Ankara is uniquely positioned to help narrow the mistrust between Tehran and Western capitals.
Another way to foster cooperation is for Iran to consider hosting a trilateral summit with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia to discuss collaboration on a post-Assad Syria. With Saudi Arabia’s growing financial role in the region and Türkiye’s close political ties to the HTS-led government, such a summit could help prevent future tensions down the line between Iran and Türkiye should Tehran be concerned that Ankara and Riyadh might sideline it in shaping Damascus’ future.
While these measures cannot erase the rivalry between two powers steeped in imperial nostalgia, cooperation between Ankara and Tehran is essential in a Middle East where neither country wants—or can afford—greater instability.
Managing Editor: Kyle Rutter
