Russia’s naval ambitions in the Red Sea
Moscow has long eyed the Red Sea as a gateway for global influence and trade. In recent years, the Kremlin revived Soviet-era plans for warm-water ports along this strategic corridor. A 2020 agreement to establish a Russian naval facility at Port Sudan was touted as a breakthrough, granting Russia a foothold on Africa’s Red Sea coast. However, Sudan’s erupting internal conflict in April 2023 derailed the deal, putting it “on hold indefinitely” after initially being offered in exchange for arms and aid. Undeterred, Russian officials have repeatedly claimed the project is back on track – as recently as February 2025 – underscoring Moscow’s persistence despite Sudan’s turmoil
With Sudan’s stability in question, Russia has courted neighboring Eritrea as an alternate anchor. Eritrea’s authoritarian leadership, diplomatically isolated from the West, has signaled openness to deeper ties with Moscow – even hinting at hosting a foreign base in the future Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Eritrea in early 2023, discussing access to the Red Sea port of Massawa and signing a cooperation memorandum with Eritrean officials. Potential sites like Massawa or Assab could give Russia a strategic berth near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, complementing its naval facility in Syria and projecting power along vital shipping lanes. In Egypt, while no base is on the horizon, Moscow has strengthened naval diplomacy. Joint exercises such as the regular “Friendship Bridge” drills, first launched in 2015, reflect growing Russia-Egypt defense ties Russian warships have also made port calls in Egypt, highlighting a quiet naval presence around the Suez Canal. Together, these engagements with Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt illustrate Russia’s realpolitik drive to secure Red Sea access and protect its maritime trade (an estimated 8–10% of Russia’s foreign commerce moves through Suez and the Red Sea).
China’s strategic foothold in Djibouti
Beijing’s entry into the Red Sea arena has been swift and transformative. In 2017, China opened its first-ever overseas military base in Djibouti, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The PLA Navy’s Djibouti facility – officially a “logistics support base” – sits just miles from the US Camp Lemonnier, symbolizing China’s expanding global reach. Chinese officials insist the base supports anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, but its mere 7-mile proximity to America’s largest African base has raised US eyebrows. Notably, Djibouti now hosts at least eight foreign military bases (American, Chinese, French, Japanese and more) due to its strategic location at the Red Sea’s mouth, where roughly 10–12% of global trade transits each year
China’s presence extends well beyond troops on the ground. State-owned Chinese firms have invested heavily in Djibouti’s ports and infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China Merchants Group holds stakes in Djibouti’s key container terminals and helped finance the modern Doraleh port complex. Beijing’s dual economic–military strategy is evident: Chinese companies build and operate port facilities, then the PLA Navy gains access. (Doraleh, initially a commercial venture, was quietly expanded in 2017 to host China’s naval pier) Across the wider Red Sea region, Chinese investment runs into the billions of dollars, funding ports, railways and industrial zones that knit into the BRI’s maritime silk road. For example, Chinese enterprises have a hand in Egypt’s Suez Canal Economic Zone developments and recently agreed to build a large new container terminal at Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea coast. This economic foothold bolsters China’s energy security and trade: vital oil and LNG shipments from the Persian Gulf pass through Bab el-Mandeb, as do China–Europe container routes. In short, China has secured a strategic Djibouti anchor and a network of regional investments to safeguard the Red Sea leg of its global supply chain.
Trade routes and chokepoints: global stakes
The Red Sea–Suez corridor is a jugular vein of world commerce, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Close to 15% of global trade – from Mideast oil to Asian manufactures – travels via these waters toward the Suez Canal. Likewise, the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait sees enormous energy flows. In 2023, an estimated 8.6 million barrels of crude and petroleum products per day transited Bab el-Mandeb, roughly 10% of seaborne oil trade. This makes the Red Sea a strategic prize but also a vulnerable chokepoint. Any disruption can send shockwaves through global markets – as seen when a grounded megaship blocked the Suez Canal in 2021, or when past Arab–Israeli wars closed the canal entirely.
Today, instability at the Red Sea’s southern end is a real concern. Yemen’s ongoing civil war has periodically spilled into the maritime domain: the Iran-backed Houthi rebels have used mines, drones and missiles to threaten ships near Bab el-Mandeb. Late 2023 saw a surge of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels (nominally targeting Israeli-linked ships in solidarity with Gaza). In reality these strikes hit indiscriminately – even a Russian-owned tanker was struck by a Houthi missile in January 2024 The violence forced some shippers to reroute vessels around Africa, adding weeks of transit. By mid-2024, oil transit through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had plummeted by over 50%, falling to just 4 million barrels/day as wary tankers avoided the danger zone. Such disruptions underscore how quickly local conflicts can endanger global supply lines.
US and allied responses
Western powers and regional allies have not been idle in the face of Russia and China’s expanding Red Sea roles. The United States maintains a robust presence – centered on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti – to safeguard shipping lanes and counter terrorism. US Naval Forces Central Command (5th Fleet) regularly patrols the Red Sea corridor, and American warships have intervened directly against emergent threats. Since late 2023, US destroyers and allied vessels have shot down dozens of Houthi-launched drones and missiles menacing Red Sea shipping. In one notable case, the USS Carney intercepted a “complex” barrage of Houthi missiles heading toward commercial ships and potentially Israel. This rapid response likely prevented a major maritime crisis. Meanwhile, European allies such as France (which also bases forces in Djibouti) and the UK have enhanced naval security missions in the region, building on years of anti-piracy operations off Somalia. Even Japan – heavily reliant on Middle East oil – operates a base in Djibouti and deploys naval assets to protect freedom of navigation.
Strategically, Washington is also adjusting to great-power competition on the Red Sea. Concerned by Beijing’s Djibouti stronghold, US policymakers are exploring deeper partnerships with Red Sea states and Gulf allies. One proposal envisions a “triangle of influence” linking the US , the UAE, and Israel to support Djibouti with economic and security incentives as a counterweight to China. American diplomats are likewise re-engaging Sudan’s neighbors and the new Red Sea littoral forum to promote stability. While the US still far outpaces China militarily in the region, officials acknowledge that influence cannot be taken for granted when Chinese trade and investment loom so large. Thus, expect sustained US naval patrols, training initiatives with local navies, and quiet diplomacy to keep this corridor open and balance the new Russian and Chinese presence.
Implications for Israel’s security and trade
For Israel, the Red Sea is both a critical artery and a potential arena of risk. The waterway provides Israel’s only direct link from Eilat to the Indian Ocean, and via the Suez Canal to Asia. Historically, blockading the Red Sea has been viewed by Israel as an existential threat – the closure of the Straits of Tiran in 1967 helped trigger war. Today’s challenges are more complex. Yemen’s Houthi rebels, for instance, explicitly threatened Israeli shipping in late 2023, raising alarm in Jerusalem that one of its main shipping routes could be cut off. In practice, only a small portion of Israel’s trade (mostly imports from Asia) actually transits the Red Sea, limiting the economic impact of disruptions. But even a temporary diversion of cargo ships around Africa drives up costs and underscores Israel’s geographic vulnerability. Memories of the 1967–1975 Suez Canal closure – which forced Israeli goods to circumnavigate the continent – linger as a cautionary tale. Not surprisingly, Israel has beefed up its naval posture in these waters.
In recent years the Israeli Navy has quietly extended its reach into the Red Sea and beyond. Under US auspices, Israel now participates in multinational Red Sea security exercises, drilling alongside Arab states and Western navies to counter piracy and terror threats. Israeli warships have reportedly escorted commercial vessels at risk and even carried out covert strikes on hostile targets in Yemen when vital interests were at stake. The presence of Russian and Chinese fleets adds a new dimension: Jerusalem must navigate carefully to protect its freedom of operation without clashing with these great powers. While Israel maintains cordial ties with both Moscow and Beijing, it relies on the US-led security framework in the Red Sea. Thus, an expanded Russian base or a growing Chinese flotilla could complicate Israel’s calculus – for example, by boosting Iran’s confidence or constraining Israeli naval movements. At the same time, a stronger international patrol presence might deter common threats like arms smuggling to Gaza or attacks on shipping. Israeli officials therefore watch the Red Sea chessboard closely, weighing how Russia’s and China’s moves might affect the delicate balance of maritime security.
Regional instability and great-power maneuvering
The backdrop to Russia and China’s Red Sea foray is a region rife with instability. The protracted war in Yemen has turned the Bab el-Mandeb into a flashpoint where militias target tankers and trigger global alar In Sudan, the outbreak of fighting between rival generals not only stalled Khartoum’s foreign partnerships but also raised fears of a humanitarian and security vacuum on the Red Sea’s western shore. Both Moscow and Beijing have had to recalibrate their approaches as these conflicts unfold – evacuating citizens, pausing investments, or engaging in quiet mediation. Instability can both hinder and invite great-power involvement: Russia’s naval base plans were thrown into limbo by Sudan’s war, yet Moscow may see opportunity in offering Sudan’s embattled leaders military aid for future access. China, for its part, has generally avoided entanglement in local wars, but it has dispatched envoys to promote peace in the Horn of Africa and even offered to mediate the Yemen conflict. Both powers publicly stress that their Red Sea presence contributes to regional stability – protecting trade routes from piracy or terrorism. Indeed, international naval patrols did suppress Somali piracy a decade ago, a success all stakeholders welcomed. But an emerging concern is that the Red Sea could become a theater for major power rivalry layered atop local conflicts. As Russian, Chinese, American, and allied vessels all operate in proximity, the risk of miscalculation or proxy friction grows. A crowded geopolitical stage also means Red Sea littoral states must deftly manage external suitors while addressing internal strife.
In summary, the Red Sea in August 2025 stands at a crossroads of global strategic currents. Russia and China’s expanding footprint – one reviving old Soviet ambitions, the other extending a modern Silk Road – is reshaping the security landscape of this vital corridor. Their moves have prompted a measured response from the United States and partners determined to maintain open sea lanes. For countries like Israel, which straddle the region’s nexus of trade and security, the stakes are high but nuanced: opportunities for cooperation exist alongside new vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the Red Sea’s future will be influenced not just by great-power competition, but by the resolution of regional conflicts in Yemen and Sudan that continue to threaten the lifelines of global commerce. A balance between external engagement and local stability will be key to keeping this strategic waterway a conduit for prosperity rather than confrontation.
Tags: Red Sea
