Written by Romain Blachier
Image credit: Provided by the author. The onshore wind turbines in Taiwan.
Introduction
Taiwan’s energy debate is too often reduced to emission trajectories or electricity pricing. In reality, it is a question of national security. In 2024, total electricity consumption reached a record 283.82 billion kWh, driven by the AI boom and semiconductor expansion. The island’s last nuclear reactor was shut down on 17 May 2025, just four days after the legislature passed an amendment allowing 20-year licence extensions—signalling a potential policy reversal. President Lai Ching-te’s January 2025 AI investment plan further heightens the stakes.
Taiwan imports 97–98% of its primary energy. In 2024, electricity generation relied on liquified natural gas (LNG) (42.4%), coal (39.3%), renewables (11.6%), and nuclear (~4.2%). The government’s “532” mixed energy —50% gas, 30% coal, 20% renewables—has been repeatedly postponed, most recently beyond 2026 due to legislative restrictions on ground-mounted solar. Taiwan has not met its renewable targets once in eight years.
LNG dependency is deepening as part of a cross-party consensus to replace coal. Supply depends on Qatar, Australia, Malaysia, and increasingly the United States, which transits through the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea. Strategic LNG reserves cover only 11–14 days, compared to over two months for Japan. The three main import terminals are concentrated on the west coast, within direct range of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missiles. During military exercises, these terminals have been explicitly identified as targets. In 2024, successful cyber intrusions against Taiwan’s energy network doubled year-on-year.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led phase-out culminated with Maanshan’s shutdown on 17 May 2025. The referendum record reveals deep democratic tensions: in 2018, a clear majority voted to maintain nuclear; the government proceeded with closures regardless. In August 2025, a restart referendum failed to reach the turnout threshold, though voters overwhelmingly favoured reopening.
The critical development was the 13 May 2025 amendment to the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act, passed 60–51 by votes from Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), allowing licence renewals of up to 60 years. In November 2025, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) approved Taipower’s feasibility assessment: Kuosheng (No.2) and Maanshan (No.3) restarts are technically viable; Chinshan (No.1) is not. Formal restart plans are expected by March 2026. Support is growing—from within the Lai administration, AIT, and industry figures, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, who declared in Taipei that “Taiwan should absolutely invest in nuclear”. However, safety inspections and reoperation timelines range from 1.5 to 5 years.
TSMC produces over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. In 2024, its consumption hit 25.55 billion kWh—approximately 9% of Taiwan’s total—and could nearly triple to 24% by 2030, driven by EUV lithography. TSMC now faces electricity costs in Taiwan that exceed those in the US, Japan, or Germany, with industrial rates rising 25–39% since 2024.
The AI plan adds further pressure: 5 GW of additional demand is projected by 2030. The IEA estimates that AI data centre demand will quadruple globally by 2030, consuming six times as much power as conventional centres. Taiwan has halted approvals for data centres above 5 MW north of Taoyuan. Taipower’s accumulated losses reached NT$420 billion (~US$14 billion) by the end of 2025, constraining grid investment capacity.
Offshore wind is the most advanced pillar: 3.04 GW installed by the end of 2024, 935 MW added in 2025, seventh globally. Phase 3 targets 15 GW by 2035 at 1.5 GW/year. Floating wind could unlock deep-water potential, with European partnerships—Danish and French—remaining critical.
Geothermal energy is ideally suited, strategically, for an island at risk of blockade: constant baseload, import-independent, and weather-independent. Yet only 7.29 MW is installed. Google signed Taiwan’s first corporate geothermal PPA in 2024, and Taipower partnered with Baseload Capital and GreenFire Energy for Tatun development. Obstacles are institutional, not geological: mandatory vertical drilling, high exploration costs, and land-use conflicts. France and New Zealand offer natural expertise partnerships.
Solar PV leads renewables at 14.28 GW, but ground-mounted deployment faces new restrictions. Mandatory rooftop solar on new buildings takes effect in August 2026. Green hydrogen and battery storage (590 MW target by 2025, 20 GWh by 2030) remain pre-commercial.
The Lai administration’s institutional response—the National Climate Change Committee and the Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Committee—must translate into concrete reforms. Taipower’s NT$564.5 billion grid resilience plan aims to shift from a centralised to a distributed model. Priority axes include maintaining the pace of offshore wind deployment, reforming geothermal drilling regulations, raising LNG reserves beyond 14 days, progressively reducing electricity subsidies, and drawing on Danish and French grid integration expertise.
The question of blockade survival is debated: from “not a month” to “at least a year with rationing and renewables.” A November 2025 FDD tabletop exercise revealed that Washington’s offer to fill LNG gaps was conditional on strategic concessions, while Japan proposed a formal coordination mechanism. Taiwan’s energy resilience is not merely domestic—it is a collective Indo-Pacific security concern.
Taiwan’s energy system sits at the intersection of fossil fuel dependency, AI-driven demand growth, and unprecedented geopolitical pressure. The nuclear phase-out tightened the equation, though legislative developments have reopened that door. The AI plan demands energy production far exceeding current capacity. Taiwan must simultaneously accelerate the deployment of renewables, modernise its grid, strengthen reserves, reform governance, and navigate the nuclear question, with virtually no margin for error. Energy security is no longer a policy luxury: it is the condition of possibility for Taiwan’s democratic sovereignty.
Romain Blachier is President of Association France-Formosa (Franco-Taiwanese cultural diplomacy), a professional in the renewable energy sector in France, a political commentator in French media, and Lecturer in geopolitics and energy markets at IEP de Lyon, ILERI, INSEEC, University Lyon 1, and HEIP. A former Deputy Mayor of Lyon and Metropolitan Councillor (2008–2020), he has participated in official MOFA-hosted missions to Taiwan.
