While the outcomes of the successful early November P-TEC conference by the Atlantic Council in Athens (positioning Greece as the main energy hub for US LNG in the Eastern Mediterranean) are still being celebrated, just a couple of weeks later, Turkey and Iran orchestrated a six-country agreement to expand freight movement along the southern branch of the Eurasian Transit Corridor: on November 21, Turkey, Iran, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement that standardizes tariffs, reduces customs frictions, and commits all parties to significant rail upgrades. The goal is to redirect a meaningful share of China-Europe trade (an estimated 60 million tons last year) onto a corridor that bypasses Russia, shortens transit times, and deepens Turkey’s role as Eurasia’s bridge.
Turkey further announced its plans to expand its network of logistics centers from 12 to 37, modernize thousands of kilometers of railway, and integrate ports, industrial zones, and free-trade areas into a dense multimodal grid, aiming at positioning itself as a rule-setter within a Eurasian marketplace that is diversifying away from traditional northern routes. Turkey’s growing ties with China and Iran raise questions about regulatory compatibility, data governance, and the strategic direction of Eurasian commerce.
Greece’s trajectory, supported by the United States, reflects a different geopolitical approach, embedding Greece more deeply within the transatlantic system to ensure stability and alliance cohesion: Greece is emerging as a south-north energy and security corridor aiming at reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Greece’s LNG terminals – Revithoussa and the Alexandroupoli floating unit – along with the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector and the broader “Vertical Corridor,” will anchor Southeastern Europe’s gas diversification strategy. The port of Alexandroupoli is now a NATO logistics hub enabling rapid deployment to Eastern Europe without transiting the congested and politically sensitive Turkish Straits. Rail upgrades connecting Alexandroupoli to Bulgaria and Romania signal a longer-term shift: Greece is becoming a forward-leaning node in Europe’s defense and energy architecture.
Since the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, the US has instituted the emerging US transatlantic energy framework through the “3+1” format (Greece, Cyprus, Israel + the United States) focused on energy corridors, electricity interconnectors, offshore gas cooperation, and the political umbrella supporting Athens’ position as the Western corridor of choice for energy and digital infrastructure originating in the Middle East also within the longer-term strategic framework of India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
Turkey, on the other hand, has countered IMEC’s momentum by championing the Development Road, a $20 billion Iraq-Turkey mega-corridor aiming to bring Gulf cargo north through Basra and into southern Turkey before reaching Europe.
Yet the EU’s position remains nuanced as it continues to invest heavily in Turkey’s logistical backbone – particularly in Eastern Marmara, Turkey’s industrial heartland. EU financial institutions have funded key portions of Istanbul’s intercontinental rail system and major westbound lines to the Bulgarian border.
However, today’s strategic corridors are no longer neutral economic assets; they shape alignment, dependencies, and the balance of influence across the continent. The EU’s investments have not always matched geopolitical intent: The EU needs to ensure now more than ever that European standards on security, customs, digital systems, and energy remain intact and, in doing so, it cannot afford to underestimate Greece’s increased geopolitical status.
The US, through its updated partnership with Greece as a reliable energy and logistics hub, is anchoring a trusted triangle in a turbulent region. The EU now needs to align with the US on long-term energy security planning so as to shape a framework where connectivity strengthens European sovereignty rather than diluting it: It should prioritize integrating the Alexandroupoli-Bulgaria-Romania axis fully into TEN-T, fast-track funding for the Sea-to-Sea corridor linking the Aegean and Black Sea. Further, it needs to proactively support Greece’s key strategic role in the key transatlantic alliance with the US as the entry point for energy and connectivity rather than reactively limiting Greece to a role of a mere buffer for immigration inflows caused by geopolitical instability in the wider region.
Whether Europe emerges stronger will depend not on the scale of its regulation, but on its ability to match strategic ambition with timely, coordinated investment and align with the US energy prerogatives. Greece is positioned to play a pivotal role in reinforcing Europe’s transatlantic alliance with the US.
Niovi Christopoulou, Esq., is a law professor at the City University of New York and an AI investor.
