President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Venezuela and capture president Nicolás Maduro ignited a flurry of commentary in the United States about what this would mean for China’s ambitions vis-à-vis Taiwan. Some worried that China could invoke Trump’s unilateral actions as a precedent to snatch Taiwan’s president, while others argued that the United States had lost its moral high ground to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. In reality, Trump’s actions in Venezuela will have little impact on Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s calculations.
First, and most fundamentally, China has not refrained from attacking Taiwan because it was waiting for the United States to set a precedent it could follow. Instead, China has not attacked Taiwan because it lacks confidence that it can succeed at an acceptable cost. If China develops a military that it believes can overrun Taiwan and defeat a U.S.-led coalition, then cross-Strait dynamics will fundamentally change. Until that day comes, though, China will continue with its strategy of employing coercion to wear down Taiwan’s people, with the aim of forcing Taiwan to the negotiating table. The U.S. strikes on Venezuela do not change this dynamic.
Second, China understands that U.S. operations in Venezuela do not offer a model for its operations against Taiwan. The U.S. strikes have thus far been confined to removing Venezuela’s leader, with little planning for what comes next. Despite Trump’s statements that the United States would “run” Venezuela, details are sparse. China, however, aims to govern Taiwan indefinitely. To achieve that objective, it would almost surely seek to take out Taiwan’s political and military leadership as part of any full-scale attack. But China has no illusions that this alone would cause Taiwanese society to crumble and lead to unification. Instead, China would need to land hundreds of thousands of troops on the island, conquer cities, and impose martial law on twenty-three million people. Ultimately, China faces a far more daunting task than the one the United States faced in Venezuela, which reinforces deterrence.
Third, while Trump’s actions may have violated international law, China does not believe international law applies to the case of Taiwan. It does not view Taiwan as a sovereign country and its leadership as the legitimate rulers of a country. Instead, Beijing insists that Taiwan is an internal affair, thus giving it nearly unlimited latitude to do what it pleases in the Taiwan Strait. For China’s leaders, these norms around sovereignty never applied to Taiwan in the first place, and therefore Trump undermined something that is irrelevant to their calculations.
Fourth, while the attack on Venezuela may make it more difficult for the United States to present its case for intervening on Taiwan’s behalf if China were to attack, that hurdle would not prevent it from doing so. The reality of international politics is that the United States would defend Taiwan if it believes that it has a vital national interest in doing so. China understands this: the attack on Venezuela only further solidifies China’s long-held belief that the so-called rules-based international order is just a façade and a cover for U.S. dominance.
Fifth and finally, while China will seize on Trump’s actions to portray the United States as an irresponsible power that flouts international law and sows chaos, this will not affect the willingness of U.S. allies to contribute to a U.S.-led defense of Taiwan. U.S. allies have been careful not to explicitly criticize the strikes on Venezuela. They would not refrain from supporting the United States in the Taiwan Strait because they believed the United States violated international law in Latin America. Rather, countries like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea would support a U.S.-led intervention if they believed that their alliance with the United States remained critical to their security and were committed to maintaining a balance of power in the region.
The U.S. ability to insert special forces into a heavily protected part of Venezuela and exfiltrate its president could have the beneficial effect of demonstrating to Taiwan the importance of investing in the protection of its political leadership and developing robust continuity of government plans. Taiwan assumes that China will attempt to remove its political leadership at the outset of a conflict. China’s construction of a replica of Taiwan’s presidential office at a combat training center in Inner Mongolia is just one piece of evidence of such intent. But the U.S. strikes could add needed urgency for Taiwan to refine its continuity of government exercises.
There are reasons to disagree with President Trump’s decision to strike Venezuela and seize Maduro, from his failure to consult Congress to his lack of planning for what comes next. Objecting to U.S. strikes on the basis that this will give China a green light to attack Taiwan, however, is misplaced. China is neither more nor less likely to use force against Taiwan than it was prior to the U.S. strikes against Venezuela. This is because Beijing remains unsure that it has the military capability to compel unification and because it is confident that its strategy of coercion is working.
