More fake extensions linked to GlassWorm found in Open VSX code marketplace

73 new phony extensions added this month, say researchers at Socket, as the supply chain attacks continue.

Malware

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The threat actor seeding the Open VSX code marketplace with fraudulent extensions that download the GlassWorm malware has uploaded 73 more impersonated links, as its attempt to infect software supply chains continues.

Philipp Burckhardt, head of threat intelligence at Socket, which revealed the latest activity, called it a “significant escalation” in the gang’s activity, after it added 72 malicious extensions last month.

The extensions impersonate trusted developer tools. More recently, the listed extensions contain benign code so they will evade malware scanners. Later, after connecting automatically to newly-created GitHub or other public accounts, they download GlassWorm to developers’ computers as an update. This latest wave includes some extensions that rely on bundled native binaries.

“The extension itself acts as a thin loader,” Socket explained in its report. “By shifting critical logic outside of what tools typically scan, and spreading it across multiple delivery mechanisms, the threat actor increases the likelihood of evading detection.”

Of the 73 new extensions seen by Socket, last week, six were activated to connect to sources of malware. This week, eight more were activated, Burckhardt said in an interview.

Socket has notified the Eclipse Foundation, which oversees the Open VSX marketplace, of the latest fraudulent additions, and Burckhardt expects that by now all 73 have been deleted.

But the continuing attacks are another example of how threat actors are trying to use open code marketplaces used by developers, such as Open VSX and npm, to compromise applications as they are being created, to enable the later distribution of data stealing malware.

Extensions are add-on modules that help developers speed application creation. Since Microsoft’s Visual Studio Code is one of the most common code editors around the world, VS Code extensions are a tempting target for threat actors. Popular extensions include utilities that do everything from analyzing JavaScript, TypeScript, and other supported languages for potential errors, to AI tools that suggest code completions. The Eclipse Foundation says the Open VSX registry hosts over 12,000 extensions from more than 8,000 publishers.

GlassWorm, despite its name, isn’t a worm, but a loader. According to StepSecurity, GlassWorm’s stage 3 payload includes a dedicated credential theft module that harvests GitHub and npm tokens from multiple sources. The attacker then uses these credentials to force-push malware into all of the victim’s repositories.

The loader includes host gating that detects and negates the dropping of malware on Russian language computers, leaving Burckhardt to suspect that the threat actors behind this campaign are Russian.

Tanya Janca, who teaches secure coding through her firm, SheHacksPurple, observed, “what makes the GlassWorm campaign particularly dangerous and interesting is that it exposes a systemic gap in how we secure developer environments.”

“With software packages, we have lockfiles, pinned hashes, and reproducible builds. With IDE [integrated development environment] extensions, we have almost nothing. There is no integrity verification, no equivalent of package-lock.json, and most organizations have no policy whatsoever governing what developers are allowed to install into their IDEs.”

 Malicious actors have noticed the gap. For them, targeting VS Code extensions is a lower-friction attack surface than targeting packages, she said, specifically because the controls that organizations have spent years building around their dependency pipelines simply do not exist for extensions.

The reason only some of the 73 extensions had been activated before the warning spread is certainly deliberate, Janca added. “This looks like an intentionally staged deployment: publish them all broadly to establish credibility and accumulate downloads, then activate harmful subsets over time to avoid triggering mass detection and to preserve a reserve of ready assets if some are removed or noticed.

Janca said developers who want to reduce their exposure to the GlassWorm campaign should start with the basics: install fewer extensions and treat each one as a dependency with real risk attached. Disable auto-update so you control when updates are applied, and carefully evaluate each one. Use a next-generation SCA tool that covers IDE extensions and other areas of the supply chain, not just third party packages and components.

“One thing most people overlook,” she added: “Audit what you already have installed. Extensions accumulate over the years and the developer who built that extension in 2022 may not be the same person maintaining it today.”

Teams that want stronger guarantees should use a behavioral monitoring tool that watches runtime activity, Janca said, not just install-time content. Establish a formal approval process for new extensions, with security sign-off. Maintain an allowlist of approved extensions, and do not install from alternative marketplaces like Open VSX without treating it as a higher-risk source.

“The same discipline we apply to open source packages needs to be applied to the tools living inside our IDEs and the rest of our software supply chain,” she said.

Burckhardt said CSOs need to ensure developers are trained to recognize phony extensions, carefully examining the names of files they are looking for to avoid being fooled by typosquatting, and verifying a publisher is legitimate. Some GlassWorm-related extensions have more downloads than a legitimate extension, he noted, a suspicious sign.

Developers should also be restricted in what they can download, he added, particularly extensions newly added to a repository. It may also be necessary to disable the ability to automatically download extension updates, he said, and developers should be warned to only download extensions they need, not ones to experiment with.

CSOs should also look for security tools that give visibility into what developers download, Burckhardt added.

And to help detect Open VSX issues, earlier this month the Eclipse Foundation announced the Open VSX Security Researcher Recognition Program to encourage responsible vulnerability disclosure.

 

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